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Abstract—In Europe the Single European Sky air traffic
management master plan foresees the introduction of several
modern digital data links for aeronautical communications.
The candidate for long-range continental communications
is LDACS. LDACS is a cellular, ground-based digital com-
munications system for flight guidance and communications
related to safety and regularity of flight. Hence, the aero-
nautical standards for cybersecurity of the link layer and
the network layer apply. In previous works, threat- and risk
analyses of LDACS were conducted, a draft for an LDACS
cybersecurity architecture was introduced, algorithms pro-
posed, and the security of the Station-to-Station (STS)-based
Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment (MAKE)
procedure of LDACS formally verified. However, options for
cipher-suites and certificate management for LDACS are still
missing. This paper proposes a cell-attachment procedure,
which establishes a secure LDACS communication channel
between an aircraft and corresponding ground-station upon
cell-entry of the aircraft, that addresses these shortcomings.
It introduces a full cell-attachment protocol including cipher-
suites and certificate revocation for LDACS.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity, Authentication, Key Establish-
ment, SIGMA, LDACS, Tamarin, Control Channel Protec-
tion, Communication Performance
1. Introduction
EUROCONTROL estimates European air traffic to
recover from the COVID-19 pandemic by 2024 to 74% to
up to 105% compared to the air traffic level of 2019 [1].
With increasing recovery, shortcomings of the current Air
Traffic Management (ATM) become pressing once again.
Increasing saturation of the Very High Frequency (VHF)
band in some regions of the world, such as Europe [2],
lacking digitalization, bandwidth and cybersecurity [3]
are all obstacles for civil air traffic growth. In Europe,
the SESAR ATM Master Plan [4] foresees the intro-
duction of several modern digital data links for ATM
communications. The candidate for long-range terrestrial
communications, covering the En-Route (ENR) phase of
flight, is L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication Sys-
tem (LDACS). LDACS is a cellular, ground-based digital
communications system for flight guidance and commu-
nications related to the safety and regularity of flight
[5]. Internationally, LDACS is reflected in the Global Air
Navigation Plan (GANP) of International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), and is currently under standardiza-
tion [6].
LDACS will be one link layer technology transporting
data in ICAO’s Air Traffic Network/IP-Protocol Suite
(ATN/IPS) network [7]. Hence relevant aeronautical stan-
dards for the cybersecurity of the link layer technology
itself, the network infrastructure it is deployed in and
relevant applications enabled by LDACS apply. Those are
ICAO Doc 9896 [7] and Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics DO-379 [8].
All these documents define access control, options to
protect user data in transit on link layer, and protection
of the control plane of the radio access technology, as a
requirement to be incorporated into the Air Traffic Net-
work (ATN)/IP-Protocol Suite (IPS) network. In previous
works, threat- and risk analysis of LDACS were conducted
[9], [10], a draft for an LDACS cybersecurity architecture
introduced [11], [12], algorithms proposed [13], [14] and
the security of the Station to Station (STS)-based Mutual
Authentication and Key Establishment (MAKE) procedure
of LDACS formally verified [15]. Thereby, the low data
rates of aeronautical systems, which originates from low
limited dedicated spectrum for civil aviation and resulting
500 kHz channel sizes for LDACS [16], is respected.
Hence, the rationale for the cell-attachment procedure is to
reduce the amount of security message exchanges between
GS and AS and the overall amount of the LDACS security
overhead [11], [13].
Previous works were missing options for cipher suites
for LDACS, negotiation of security algorithms, enabling
security goals such as authentication or message integrity
protection, as well as the possibility to check for the
validity of LDACS certificates. As previous MAKE pro-
cedures did not take these requirements into account, a
remodelled, more efficient cell-attachment procedure with
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Figure 1: LDACS cell entry procedure [16]
The objective of this paper is to propose a cell-
attachment procedure establishing a secure LDACS com-
munication channel between an aircraft and corresponding
ground-station upon cell-entry of that aircraft. Thus, Sec-
tion 2 includes all required technical background knowl-
edge and is completed with related work presented in
Section 3. Section 4 pins down the design goals on the
envisioned protocols leading to the protocol specification
(cf. Section 5). The prove of reaching the design goals and
envisioned functionality is depicted in Section 6 before
concluding the paper.
2. Background on LDACS
LDACS is a ground-based digital bidirectional com-
munications system for flight guidance and communica-
tions related to the safety and regularity of flight [5].
It has been developed in Europe and is currently under
standardization in ICAO [6], [16]. It covers current Air
Traffic Services (ATS), Aeronautical Operational Control
(AOC) data and also foresees future applications, en-
abling new concepts such as sectorless ATM. A single
LDACS cell can serve up to 512 Aircraft Station (AS)
that communicate to an LDACS Ground Station (GS) in
the Reverse Link (RL). The GS communicates to the AS
in the Forward Link (FL). LDACS offers dynamic Coding
and Modulation Scheme (CMS) depending on channel
quality and enables 230.53 to 1428.27 kbps in the FL
and 235.30 to 1390.40 kbps in the RL per LDACS cell,
which is up to 90 times the net capacity than the currently
used terrestrial links like the VHF Digital Link Mode 2
(VDLm2) system [16]. For the cell-attachment procedure
of LDACS, a basic understanding of the LDACS cell entry
procedure, as well as logical channels and the difference
between user and control plane is required. To enter an
LDACS cell, served by a GS, an AS has to undergo an
initial cell entry procedure shown in Figure 1.
Every GS sends a continuous stream of data in the FL
consisting of the Broadcast (BC), where the GS announces
the existence of that LDACS cell, and Common Control
(CC) control channel, where resources are allocated to
AS, and the user Data Channel (DCH). Every AS sends
in data bursts using resources allocated by the GS. Hence,
the RL consists of the Random Access (RA), where AS
requests access to an LDACS cell, the Dedicated Control
(DC) control channel, where AS request resources, that
allow them to send user data, and the user DCH. LDACS
data is transported in Physical Layer Service Data Unit
(PHY-SDU), e.g., with CC PHY-SDU referring to a total
possible amount of 728 b CC control data that can be
transported within this specific PHY-SDU. [16]
TABLE 1: AMS Security Algorithms
Scheme Implementation
Signature Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm




Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) unified
static model per ANSI X9.63
Key Deriva-
tion
Key Derivation Function (KDF) per ANSI X9.63
with SHA-256 as underlying hash-algorithm
using as input:
(1) the shared secret calculated from combin-
ing the static public key QU/V and static
private key qV/U
(2) an initialization time InitTime = Time in
UTC measured by the AS and





Hash-based Message Authentication Code
(HMAC) with SHA-256 truncated to 128, 64,
32 b most significant bits (32 b by default
defined in ICAO Doc 9705 [20])
Confidential-
ity
Either NULL encryption algorithm per RFC
2410 [21] or AES with 128-bit block size
in Cipher-Feedback (CFB) mode (AES-128-
CFB128)
3. Related Work
Here relevant security details of related terrestrial
aeronautical communications systems Aeronautical Mo-
bile Airport Communication System (AeroMACS) and
Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting Sys-
tem (ACARS) are introduced with a special focus the
at requirements for LDACS security. The section closes
with comparing different MAKE protocols, cipher suite
options, and certificate revocation schemes with each other
to pave the ground for the design goals and envisioned
protocol presented in this paper.
3.1. ACARS Message Security (AMS)
AMS offers two secure session establishment proto-
cols: (1) based on public/private keys [17] and (2) based
on a pre-shared secret key [18]. The first assumes an AMS
specific Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to be in place with
corresponding Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and Cer-
tificate Distribution Center (CDS). The second assumes
that a shared secret key has been agreed prior to secure
session establishment attempt. This variation of the proto-
col behaves similarly like 4G, where a permanent key K
is shared between User Equipment (UE), more specifically
within the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM)
in the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), and
Home Subscriber Service (HSS), more specifically within
the Authentication Center (AuC) [19]. As LDACS is very
likely to have its own PKI, the analysis is focused on the
first AMS secure session establishment protocol.
Looking at the proposed protocols in [17], [18], espe-
cially at the two-way authentication, certificate exchange
and key establishment procedure, some problems become
apparent. For instance Blanchet et. al [22] identified a
key compromise impersonation attack if the long-term key
of an aircraft is compromised, due to session keys being
derived taking the long-term keys as input. One possible
solution is using ephemeral public/private Diffie-Hellman
key pairs for that purpose.
Furthermore, the cipher suites are also limited: (1)
key establishment only foresees ECDH and no other
alternative additionally; (2) user data confidentiality is
either not ensured in any way or the only other option is
AES128-CFB128; (3) message integrity and data origin-
authenticity is not provided or only by HMAC-256 with
truncated to 32 b. Finally certificate revocation is handled
poorly: while the GS requests signed CRL records to
check the validity of the aircraft’s certificate, the AS never
receives proof of the validity of the GS certificate. These
shortcomings of AMS should be avoided in the security
design of LDACS.
3.2. AeroMACS
AeroMACS Minimum Operational Performance Stan-
dards [23] mainly refer to IEEE 802.16-2009 standard [24]
for the implementation of security: The key management
protocol of AeroMACS uses Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) [25] or a PKI with X.509 digital certifi-
cates [26] together with PKCS#1 v2.1 [27], or a sequence
of RSA authentication first, followed by EAP. The used
key management protocol by AeroMACS is PKMv2 [23].
Here, the focus is on the certificate-based part. Every AS
carries a unique X.509 certificate issued by the AS man-
ufacturer binding the AS Message Authentication Code
(MAC) address to the RSA encryption key. The certificates
are based on certificate profiles, which are in turn based
on X.509 v03 certificates. The information contained in
the AS certificate is explicitly listed for completeness and
comparison with LDACS:
countryName = <Country Manufacturer>
organizationName = <Company Name>
organizationalUnitName = <City Manufacturer>
commonName = <Serial Number>
commonName = <MAC Address>




AeroMACS uses Security Association (SA), which are
sets of security information a GS and one or more AS
share to support secure communications across a network.
Three SAs (primary, static and dynamic) are defined [24].
The primary SA is obligatory and set up during the initial
connection establishment between AS and GS during the
authorization process. The used PKMv02 has two phases
for AeroMACS:
Phase 1 deals with Authentication and Authoriza-
tion. The AS first presents the certificate of its Certificate
Authority (CA). In a second message a 64 b random value,
its certificate, a Security Association ID (SAID) and an
RSA signature over all fields are sent [24], [28]. The GS
replies with the third message, including the previous and
a new random value, the pre-Primary Authorization Key
(pre-PAK) encrypted with the public key of the AS, the
lifetime and sequence number of the PAK, its certificate
and an RSA-based signature over all attributes in the mes-
sage. At this point, AS and GS are mutually authenticated
and use the Dot16KDF to derive the PAK. Optionally,
the EAP procedure may follow, before the Authorization
TABLE 2: AeroMACS Security Algorithms [23]
Scheme Implementation
Signature RSA signature algorithm defined in PKCS #1
[27] with SHA-1 [29]
Key Estab-
lishment
GS chosen pre-PAK encapsulation via RSA
and public key of AS → AK key derivation
via Dot16KDF based on EAP or RSA or both
→ KEKs and H/CMAC keys are derived
from AK → TEK is generated by the GS and
transmitted encrypted via AES and the KEK:












Key (AK) is derived via Dot16KDF, PAK and previously
exchanged input parameters.
Phase 2 represents the PKMv2 SA TEK 3-
Way handshake. Cryptographic capabilities are ex-
changed between AS and GS: a cipher-suite is agreed
upon, keys for either cipher-based MAC (CMAC) or
HMAC via Dot16KDF and AK, the Key Encryption
Key (KEK). The latter is used by the GS to en-
crypt the Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) used for user
data protection. Cryptographic suites are encoded in 3
Bytes: (1) the encryption algorithm and key length,
(2) data authentication algorithm, (3) TEK Encryp-
tion Algorithm. Although IEEE 802.16-2009 offers dif-
ferent cipher suite options, AeroMACS defines only
one set (cf. Table 2). All three PKMv2 SA TEK
3-Way messages are protected by either CMAC or HMAC
generated Message Authentication Codes (MACs).
Summarizing, AeroMACS foresees no ephemeral keys
(i.e., pre-PAK and TEK are both chosen by GS only). It
only supports one cipher suite option and has no imme-
diate proof, if the used certificates are still valid (i.e., no
CA signed CRL sent with the response).
4. Secure LDACS Cell-Attachment:
Design Goals
The design of a security mechanism in LDACS cell-
attachment copes with requirements established in previ-
ous work. Further, standard protocols and well-established
approaches for embedding cryptography are re-used wher-
ever possible.
Previous security analysis of LDACS identified re-
quirements of the cell-attachment procedure [10], [11],
[13], [15]: Mutual Authentication, Perfect Forward Se-
crecy and Secure Key Establishment in event of an adver-
sary or compromise of long-term keys. This requires the
key establishment method to be based on ephemeral keys,
where both parties contribute to the final shared secrets
and the inputs are chosen freshly for every protocol run.
LDACS can be used for multiple purposes and depend-
ing on its use, different security levels are desired. This
requires multiple options for cipher suites, authentication
and key establishment. Additionally, validity of certificates
based on a mutually trusted entity, such as a CA, has
to be proven during the cell-attachment procedure. As
explained in Section 2, the LDACS data plane is split
into user- and control-data. The user-data data plane must
provide integrity and message origin-authentication and
can optionally provide confidentiality [7], [30]. To protect
the control plane of LDACS, specifically the CC channel,
where resource allocations take place, a concept for Group
Key Management was introduced [12], [31].
To ensure robustness, mechanisms of existing proto-
cols are re-used to integrate security into the LDACS cell-
attachment process. In particular, the SIGMA protocol for
mutual authenticated key agreement using four messages
is used [32]. Hence, the protocol introduced below and in
Figure 2 will bear some similarities to the SIGMA [32]
and the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [33]
protocol.
It is foreseen that LDACS has different security levels
with different cipher-suites. One reason for defining
higher, post-quantum security levels, is the lifetime of
digital aeronautical communications systems, with legacy
systems such as VDLm2 existing since the 90s [34].
Another reason is the variety of traffic transported by
LDACS: AOC data requires higher data protection, as it
contains more personal or company-related information.
ATS data on the other hand has to be integer, while being
available and readable by all aircraft in the vicinity, as
well as multiple international air traffic control offices.
First, LDACS needs to provide options for different
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) together with pub-
lic Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameter, following the work
done in [13] and looking at TLS 1.3 [35], these can
be ephemeral DH based on the discrete logarithm prob-
lem in elliptic curves (e.g. ECDH) but also quantum-
resistant candidates, such as Supersingular Isogeny Key
Encapsulation (SIKE) [36]. Secondly, different security
levels must be reflected in the used cryptography of the
accepted certificate, hence the certificate type and version
must be communicated, as well as the signature- and
hash-algorithm. Thirdly, using the idea of Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), introduced
in TLS 1.3 [35], respective algorithms protecting user
data must be agreed upon, as well as underlying hash-
algorithms required by AEAD.
Certificate revocations can be tracked by an entity
within a PKI via a CRL [26] or the Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) [37]. Here, OCSP is chosen over
CRL due to three reasons: (i) bandwidth limitations on
the air gap are a major concern for LDACS and OCSP re-
quires less network bandwidth, (ii) the ground-connection
from a GS to a CDS has several magnitudes more through-
put than the wireless LDACS connection, hence regular
updates enable near real-time status checks via OCSP,
and (iii) since AS and GS both rely on trust derived from
a CA higher up in their chain of trust, they both can trust
a CA signed OCSP message, guaranteeing the validity of
a certificate of a communication partner at a certain point
in time.
5. Secure LDACS Cell-Attachment:
The Protocol
With the design goals at hand, security mechanisms
are embedded into the existing LDACS cell-attachment.









LDACS Security Level 1: ECDSA, SHA-256 [38]
LDACS Security Level 2: ECDSA, SHA-384 [38]
LDACS Security Level 3: Falcon512 [39]











O = <PKI Operating Organization>
CN = <PKI Operating Organization>
Validity
Period
notBefore: set by Issuing CA, time of certificate
creation







O = <PKI Operating Organization>





key for every security level:
bit string extracted from certificate signing
request
LDACS Security Level 1:
algorithmIdentifier: ID-EC256PublicKey
parameter: P-256/brainpoolP256r1 [38], [40]
LDACS Security Level 2:
algorithmIdentifier: ID-EC384PublicKey
parameter: P-384/brainpoolP384r1 [38], [40]
LDACS Security Level 3:
algorithmIdentifier: ID-Falcon512PublicKey [39]




LDACS Security Level 1: ECDSA, SHA-256 [38]
LDACS Security Level 2: ECDSA, SHA-384 [38]
LDACS Security Level 3: Falcon512 [39]
LDACS Security Level 4: Falcon1024 [39]
TABLE 4: LDACS AS specific certificate content differing




notBefore: set by Issuing CA, time of certificate
creation






O = <PKI Operating Organization>
OU = < "ICAO airline three-letter
designator" >
CN = < "air device subject CN" >
5.1. LDACS Certificates and Certificate Handling
Following the recommendations for network nodes in
the ATN/IPS from ICAO Doc 9896 [7] and from DO-379
[8] the content of LDACS GS certificates is depicted in
Table 3. The differences of an AS certificate to the GS
certificate are depicted in Table 4. Since LDACS supports
different levels of security, quantum-resistant signature
schemes are only necessary from level two upwards. From
this point, however, the LDACS PKI must be entirely
based on quantum resistant schemes.
Two strategies are combined to save the bandwidth
to transmit certificate data during during flight: (1)
end-entity certificates, together with the certificate chain
up to its root of trust shall be stored securely in local
storage [7] and (2) all relevant GS certificates shall
be installed upon relevant AS prior the flight during
maintenance, i.e. for the flight’s geographical region.
LDACS AS and GS will be part of the same LDACS
PKI with the requirement of a CA higher up in the trust
chain, that both entities trust. As an end-entity certificate
compromise is much more likely to occur during the
relatively short relevant time of flight compared to a sub-
CA takeover, due to the CAs using stronger cryptography
than end-nodes, it is assumed that CAs in the chain of
trust remain trustworthy during the time of flight. Hence
a trusted CA signed OCSP confirmation of the validity
of one end-entity certificate, is assumed to be trustworthy
during flight. ICAO Doc 9896 [7] defines validity check
update rates for offline CAs every 45 days and for online
CAs every 48h. The update rates for validity checks of
respective end-entity certificates are defined at every new
LDACS cell-attachment attempt for both, the AS and GS
certificate. With that, the GS requests the update status of
AS and GS certificate from a CDS via a secure ground
connection every time, an AS attempts to join an LDACS
cell. Finally, the validity proof of the GS must also be
part of the LDACS cell-attachment procedure depicted in
Figure 2.
5.2. LDACS Cipher Suites
Four different security levels are defined, two per-
and two post-quantum, with additional ones to be defined
in the future if necessary. LDACS supports two kinds
of algorithm lists: The first EPLDACS represents choices
regarding MAKE and either integrity and authenticity pro-
tection of user data only or AEAD for user data protection,
the second CCLDACS choices for Group Key Management
(GKM) and MAC for control data protection.
AEAD is applied onto LDACS user-data Sub-Network
(SN) Packet-Data Units (PDUs) [11], which are 128 B
to 1536 B long [16] and may therefore limit the choice
of cryptographic algorithms. Overall, security level 1-2
defines pre-quantum algorithms, with 1 using a 128 b key
and 2 using a 256 b key. Security Level 3-4 defines post-
quantum algorithms, with 3 using a 128 b key and 4 using
a 256 b key again. As AES-CMAC for MAC generation
and verification, hence integrity and authenticity protec-
tion of messages, and AES-CCM for AEAD remains
secure, also with the possible threat of quantum computers
[41], on security Level 3-4 only the key establishment
and signature algorithms are updated to post-quantum
cryptography [41]. Hence, the use of efficient Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) based signature schemes (e.g.
ECDH) for security level 1-2 with P-256/brainpoolP256r1
at security level 1 and P-384/brainpoolP384r1 curves
at security level 2 are specified. Security Level 3
and above requires quantum-resistant key-lengths and
schemes. Isogeny based ephemeral key establishment such
as SIKE and the post-quantum signature scheme Falcon
with corresponding public parameters are used for this
purpose. Among the post-quantum signature candidates,
those were selected that have the smallest signature plus
public key size, as it is possible that certificates are trans-
mitted via LDACS during the cell-attachment procedure:
At security Level 3, Falcon512 is selected among the three
current National Institute of Standards and Technology
TABLE 5: LDACS EPLDACS Security Algorithms
(*SL = Security Level)
Scheme Implementation
Signature SL 1: ECDSA, SHA-256, P-256/brainpoolP256r1
[38], [40]
SL 2: ECDSA, SHA-384, P-384/brainpoolP384r1
[38], [40]
SL 3: Falcon512 [39]
SL 4: Falcon1024 [39]
Key Estab-
lishment
SL 1: ECDH, P-256/brainpoolP256r1 [38], [40]
SL 2: ECDH, P-384/brainpoolP384r1 [38], [40]
SL 3: SIKEp434 c [36]
SL 4: SIKEp751 c [36]
Key
Derivation





SL 1: 96 b tag, 128 b key, AES-128-CMAC [44]
SL 2: 128 b tag, 256 b key, AES-256-CMAC [44]
SL 3: 96 b tag, 128 b key, AES-128-CMAC [44]
SL 4: 128 b tag, 256 b key, AES-256-CMAC [44]









SL 1: 96 b tag, 128 b key, AES-128-CCM [45]
SL 2: 128 b tag, 256 b key, AES-256-CCM [45]
SL 3: 96 b tag, 128 b key, AES-128-CCM [45]
SL 4: 128 b tag, 256 b key, AES-256-CCM [45]
(NIST) Post-Quantum Cryptography competition round 3
candidates, as its signature is with 666 B1 almost four
times smaller as the other final-round candidate Dilithium
with 2420 B2. Also public key sizes of Falcon512, with
897 B, are considerably smaller than the only other post-
quantum candidate Rainbow-I, that offers a smaller sig-
nature size of 528 B but at the cost of a public key size
of 157.8 kB [42]. At security Level 4 Falcon1024 is used.
Finally, SIKEp434 c and SIKEp751 c are chosen as post-
quantum key establishment algorithms for their relatively
small public key sizes of 197 B, 315 B respectively [36].
All suggested security algorithms within EPLDACS and
CCLDACS are listed in Table 5 and Table 6, for the four
specified security levels.
Following the notations of TLS 1.3 [35], the
cryptographic methods of EPLDACS are negotiated
as LDACS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
_SHA256_P256 as an example for LDACS security level
1 with AEAD in place. Where no encryption is required
LDACS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_AES_128
_CMAC_SHA256_P256 offers an alternative, providing
message integrity and authenticity protection only.
GKM allows protecting the CC channel of
LDACS [31]. Thus, relevant algorithms to protect
the control data plane of LDACS are also specified, as
well as corresponding Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) and
Key Encryption Key (KEK) within CCLDACS. A detailed
description of the protection of LDACS the control plane
is not in scope of this work, and only the preliminary
algorithms are presented here.
5.3. The LDACS Cell-Attachment Procedure
With the cipher suite options for LDACS being de-
fined, the LDACS cell-attachment procedure is formulated
1. https://falcon-sign.info/, accessed 07/16/2021
2. https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/index.shtml, accessed 07/16/2021
TABLE 6: LDACS CCLDACS Security Algorithms
(*SL = Security Level)
Scheme Implementation
GKM SL 0-3: One-way Function Tree (OFT) [46]
Key Establishment SL 1: AES-128-CCM [45]
(TEK and KEK
encapsulation)
SL 2: AES-256-CCM [45]
SL 3: AES-128-CCM [45]
SL 4: AES-256-CCM [45]
CC PHY-SDU
protection
SL 1: 96 b tag, 128 b key, AES-128-
CMAC [44]
SL 2: 128 b tag, 256 b key, AES-256-
CMAC [44]
SL 3: 96 b tag, 128 b key, AES-128-
CMAC [44]




SL 1: 75 b tag, 128 b key, AES-128-
CMAC [44]
SL 2: 75 b tag, 256 b key, AES-256-
CMAC [44]
SL 3: 75 b tag, 128 b key, AES-128-
CMAC [44]
SL 4: 75 b tag, 256 b key, AES-256-
CMAC [44]
Key Derivation SL 1-4: HKDF [43]
as illustrated in Figure 2. Basic entities of communication
are the CDS together with OCSP server, the GS and the
AS. Moreover a generic public key agreement scheme
is considered: If X is an ephemeral secret key, then
P ← f(X) is the ephemeral public key. Z ← g(P′, X) is a
shared secret computed from public key P′ and a secret
X. ENCK denotes the encryption under key K.
Steps 1-3: The GS regularly checks the validity of
its locally stored certificates CertGS and CertASi with
the CDS and also receives signed OCSP batches. This
additionally enables the AS to verify its own certificate.
Steps 4-9: In a BC message, the GS announces its ex-
istence together with its unique identifier UAGS , LDACS
specific address SACGS and current certificate fingerprint.
The approaching AS receives this beacon, stores the GS
identifiers and checks whether or not the GS certificat
is stored it locally or not. The StatusCertGS flag is
set to ”1” else to ”0”, respectively. The AS replies in
the RA revealing its identifier UAAS . The GS checks
whether the AS certificate is stored locally and valid or
not and assigns the LDACS specific address SACAS to the
AS. The SACAS , all supported EPLDACS and CCLDACS
cryptographic options and a nonce NGS is then sent to
the GS. With that the cell entry procedure of LDACS is
done and the MAKE protocol begins via the opened DCH
channel.
Steps 10-11: The AS chooses respective DHKE and
AEAD algorithms from the provided options and stores
that choice in the algo parameter. It also stores the
received stores SACAS , and the CCLDACS algorithms.
Depending on the chosen algorithms a private key XAS is
chosen, the public key PAS is computed, and a nonce NAS
generated. All this is sent to the AS in the first MAKE
message.
Steps 12-13: The GS verifies NGS , chooses its own
private key XGS , calculates PGS and responds with the
CertGS (if requested), NAS , PGS , its OCSP validity proof
and respective the CA signature.
Steps 14-15: The AS verifies the validity of the
CertGS . It further calculates the shared secret Z, from
which it derives three keys: (1) the session key KAS,GS ,
(2) the MAC key KM and (3) the encryption key KE ,
of which (2,3) are only used in the MAKE phase. Using
KM an HMAC mAS over all identifiers is calculated and
signed together with algo, tAS , NAS , NGS in σAS Finally
σAS is encrypted with KE and sent to the GS. Please
note: the AS uses the algorithms from algo. In case no
confidentiality option was negotiated and the MAC part
in EPLDACS does not contain an encryption option (i.e.,
some HMAC variation), then AES-128-GCM is used as
minimum default.
Steps 16-18: First the GS now calculates the shared
ephemeral secret Z, from which it derives three keys: (1)
the session key KAS,GS , (2) the MAC protocol key KM
and (3) the encryption protocol key KE . Now the message
ENCKE (σAS) can be decrypted, m
′
AS be generated, and
the signature σAS can be verified. Upon success, the AS is
authentic and the GS builds a MAC of its own with using
the identifiers in GS then AS order, mGS and builds σGS
with EPLDACS, CCLDACS, PGS , PAS , NGS , NAS and
mGS . Finally σGS is encrypted with KE and sent to the
AS.
Step 19: The AS decrypts ENCKE (σGS), builds m′GS
and verifies σGS . Upon success, the GS is authentic, both
share the session key KAS,GS and have already reached
key confirmation with KM and KE .
The DCH after cell entry procedure is chosen for the
MAKE protocol, as the LDACS DCH is flexible in size
and can react to changes in the underlying cryptography.
6. Formal Security Verification of the LDACS
Cell-Attachment Procedure
Here the LDACS cell-attachment procedure is for-
mally verified with the symbolic model checker ”Tamarin”
[47]. In symbolic verification, the modeled cryptographic
schemes are treated as black boxes meaning that signature
and encryption mechanisms are assumed secure as long
as the appropriate keys are unknown to the adversary.
6.1. Tamarin Model of the LDACS
Cell-Attachment Procedure
The protocol is modelled as depicted in Figure 2
in Tamarin’s specific rule-based declarative language. A
rule can consume and produce so-called facts, whereby
emitting so-called events. The latter can be reasoned with
via the specified lemmas. Every security property like
secrecy or authentication, which the protocol is supposed
to fulfill, has to be reasoned and specified by the user.
Following the standards and recommendations from
the Tamarin documentation3 led to modelling each role
(CA, AS, GS) using state-facts that can be instantiated
infinitely, separated by public IDs and private session-
IDs. Each role starts with its own (ICAO)-ID and public-
key pair, which is generated by the standard PKI rule,
taken from the documentation. The CA is modeled only
in terms of a public-key pair which is generated once, and
then can be used by AS and GS to verify corresponding
certificates. To keep the model concise, OCSP-messages
were not modelled.
3. https://tamarin-prover.github.io/manual/, accessed 07/16/2021
CDS/OCSP Server Ground Station (GS) Aircraft Station (AS)
Manages all CertGS , CertAS , Has: SACGS , GS, AS, CA certificates: Has: UAAS , AS, GS, CA certificates:
handles CertGS , CertAS revocation CertGS , CertAS , CertCA CertAS , CertGS , CertCA
via implementing OCSP Private GS key: PrivKeyGS Private AS key: PrivKeyAS
Step 1 :
Check validity of certificates
CertGS , CertsAS fingerprints
Step 2 : Fetch CertGS , CertsAS
Check validity and revocation status
Cert status report signed by
CertCDS with same CA as AS, GS
sOCSPAS = SigCDS(OCSPCertAS )








UAGS , SACGS ,mPubKeyGS
Step 6 : Store GS LDACS address SACGS
Check existence CertGS
Calculate m′PubKeyGS = HASH(PubKeyGS)
Compare m′PubKeyGS == mPubKeyGS




UAAS , SACGS , StatusCertGS
Step 8 : Store UAAS
Verify validity CertAS via
PubKeyCA, sOCSPAS
Generate NGS , proceed:
Step 9 :
CCCH: CellEntryResponse
SACAS , EPLDACS, CCLDACS, NGS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DCH open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 10 : Store AS LDACS address SACAS
Choose DHKE, AEAD algorithms from EPLDACS
Store choice in algo, Store CCLDACS, Generate NAS
Choose secret XAS , PAS ← f(XAS)
Step 11 : algo, NAS , PAS
Step 12 : Check NGS , StatusCertGS
If CertGS requested:
Attach CertGS , sOCSPGS
Choose secret XGS , Compute PGS ← f(XGS)
Step 13 :
(CertGS)
PGS , OCSPCertGS , sOCSPGS
Step 14 : Verify validity CertGS
If correct, proceed:
Z ← g(PGS , XAS)
Generate from Z: Session key KAS,GS ,
MAC key KM , encryption key KE
Compute MACmAS ←
HMACKM (UAAS , SACAS ,UAGS , SACGS)
Compute σAS ←
SIGAS(algo, PAS , NAS , NGS ,mAS)
Step 15 : ENCKE (σAS)
Step 16 : Z ← g(PAS , XGS)
Generate from Z: Session key KAS,GS ,
MAC key KM , encryption key KE
Decrypt ENCKE (σAS) with K
′
E
Compute MAC mAS ←
HMACKM (UAAS , SACAS ,UAGS , SACGS)
Verify σAS with algo, PAS , NAS , NGS ,mAS
If correct, proceed:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AS authenticated to GS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 17 : Compute MAC mGS ←
MACKM (UAGS , SACGS ,UAAS , SACAS)
Compute σGS ← SIGGS(
EPLDACS, CCLDACS, PGS , PAS , NGS , NAS ,mGS)
Step 18 : ENCKE (σGS)
Step 19 : Decrypt ENCKE (σGS) with KE
Calculate MAC mGS ←
HMACKM (UAGS , SACGS ,UAAS , SACAS)
Verify σGS with
EPLDACS, CCLDACS, PGS , PAS , NGS , NAS ,mGS
If correct, proceed:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GS authenticated to AS → AS-GS mutually authenticated and sharing secret session key KAS,GS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 2: LDACS Cell-Attachment Procedure.
1 rule R e g i s t e r p k :
2 [ Fr ( ˜ l t kX ) ]
3 −−[ OnlyOnceV ( $X ) ]−>
4 [
5 ! Ltk ( $X , ˜ l t kX )
6 , ! Pk ( $X , pk ( ˜ l t kX ) )
7 , Out ( pk ( ˜ l t kX ) )
8 ]
9
10 rule CA in i t :
11 [ Fr ( ˜ l t k ) ]
12 −−[ OnlyOnce ( ) ]−>
13 [
14 ! LtkCA ( ˜ l t k )
15 , !PkCA( pk ( ˜ l t k ) )
16 , Out ( pk ( ˜ l t k ) )
17 ]
Listing 1: Tamarin rules to model a PKI
1 / / Compromising an agen t ’ s long − te rm key
2 rule R e v e a l l t k :
3 [ ! Ltk ( $X , l t kX ) ] −−[ C o r r u p t e d ( $X ) ]−> [ Out ( l t kX ) ]
Listing 2: Tamarin rules for key compromise of
long-term key
1 lemma e x e c u t a b l e a :
2 exists-trace
3 ”Ex ”Ex A B i a i b x y # i # j #k # l #m #n #o #p #q .
4 CreateA (A, i a ) @i & CreateG (B , i b ) @j & At tach ingWCer t (A, B , i a )@k
5 & Running (A, B , i a , x ) @l & CheckG1 (B , i b )@m & CheckA1 (A, i a )@n
6 & Running (B , A, ib , y )@o
7 & Commit (A, B , i a , <x , y>)@p & Commit (B , A, ib , <y , x>)@q”
8
9 lemma e x e c u t a b l e b :
10 exists-trace
11 ”Ex A B i a i b x y # i # j #k # l #m #n #o #p #q .
12 CreateA (A, i a ) @i & CreateG (B , i b ) @j & A t t a c h i n g N o C e r t (A, B , i a )@k
13 & Running (A, B , i a , x ) @l & CheckG1 (B , i b )@m & CheckA1 (A, i a )@n
14 & Running (B , A, ib , y )@o
15 & Commit (A, B , i a , <x , y>)@p & Commit (B , A, ib , <y , x>)@q”
Listing 3: Lemma 1
1 lemma m u t u a l a u t h e n t i c a t i o n :
2 ”AllA B x y i a # i . Commit (A, B , i a , <x , y>)@i ==>
3 ( Ex i b # j . Running (B , A, ib , y ) @j
4 & j<i
5 & not ( Ex 2 B2 i a 2 # i 2 . Commit ( A2 , B2 , ia2 , <x , y>)@i2 & not (# i 2 =# i ) )
6 )
7 | ( Ex C # r . C o r r u p t e d (C)@r & Hones t (C) @i & # r<#i ) ”
Listing 4: Lemma 2
1 lemma s e c u r e k e y e s t a b l i s h m e n t :
2 ”All A B i a x # i . Commit (A, B , i a , x ) @i ==>
3 ( Ex P i b # j #m. Knows (A, i a , P , B)@m & Knows (B , ib , P , A) @j
4 & not ( Ex D E i d #k . Knows (D, id , P , E )@k & not (#m=#k ) & not (# j =#k ) )
5 )
6 | ( Ex C # r . C o r r u p t e d (C)@r & Hones t (C) @i & # r<#i ) ”
Listing 5: Lemma 3
1 lemma s e c r e c y :
2 ”All x # i .
3 S e c r e t ( x ) @i ==>
4 not ( Ex # j . K( x ) @j )
5 | ( Ex B # r . C o r r u p t e d (B)@r & Hones t (B) @i & # r<#i ) ”
Listing 6: Lemma 4
TABLE 7: Tamarin verification results
Lemma Scope Result Steps
Executable (AS has Cert) Exists-trace 4Verified 38
Executable (AS needs Cert) Exists-trace 4Verified 37
Mutual Authentication All-traces 4Verified 92
Secure Key Exchange All-traces 4Verified 1042
Perfect Forward Secrecy All-traces 4Verified 104
Unfortunately, some protocol feature that are intro-
duced for efficiency make the model more complex. The
possible existence of a local copy of the GS’ certificate
at the AS in step 7, requires distinguishing in step 13,
whether or not a new certificate needs to be verified.
This is modeled by alternative rules, which can both be
applied at the appropriate stage of the protocol leading
to different paths and is a unique feature of the Tamarin
model checker. One benefit of this approach is, it can be
proven that the security properties of both paths hold, with
just one lemma per property - which shows that both paths
are equally secure. One exclusion is the executability-
lemma, which exists twice, as both paths need to be
formally verified.
Tamarin follows the attacker model proposed by
Dolev-Yao [48], where an ideal, powerful attacker is
assumed, who can read, block and send any message
to and from each agent. Additionally, the possibility is
assumed that the adversary can corrupt any station and
obtain their long-term secret (certificate), to prove if the
protocol fulfills the perfect-forward-secrecy requirement.
6.2. Tamarin Lemmata
In this section the proven lemmata are given in a literal
and formal representation.
Lemma 1: ”Executable” (cf. Listing 3): There exists
a trace where instance A in role AS participates in session
ia and instance B in role GS participates in session ib, A
is requesting B for cell entry, both are starting the protocol
by exchanging PAS and PGS , and finally both commit by
having the same shared data. Please note: the lemma is
split in executable a and executable b to reflect the option
of sending the GS certificate in step 11.
Lemma 2: ”Mutual Authentication via Injective
Agreement” (cf. Listing 4): If A finishes a run with B
by exchanging y, it can be sure, B also ran the protocol
with A and y has not been exchanged before in any other
run. Only exception: the private key of an honest agent
has been compromised before.
Lemma 3: ”Secure Key Establishment”
(cf. Listing 5): If A finishes a run with B, it can
be sure, that it has a fresh key P and that B also has this
key for use with A, and this key has not been established
before, except with negligible probability, implicating
that also no other agent knows it. Only exception: the
private key of an honest agent has been corrupted before.
Lemma 4: ”Perfect Forward Secrecy” (cf. List-
ing 6): The exchanged session key (KAS,GS) cannot be
known by the attacker, even when he acquires the private
key of one or both parties later on. The case, the session
key was leaked to the attacker, is excluded.
6.3. Result
For evaluation purposes, the Tamarin prover version
1.6.0 in automatic mode was used to prove the five
lemmata presented in Section 6.2. The verification took
2 m 10 s on a Ubuntu 18.04 Laptop with an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7-8650U CPU and 16GB of RAM. All five
lemmata could be verified without interaction.
The source code of the Tamarin model is available
for download at GitHub4. The ”scope” column states
which type of proof has been done: ’exists-trace’-proofs
verify, that the given property or lemma holds at least for
one trace of the protocol; ’all-traces’-proofs respectively
verify that the property holds for all traces. The last
column displays the number of verification steps that were
executed by Tamarin to verify the lemma. As all lemmata
4. https://github.com/kr4ck-com/LDACSCellAttProof, accessed
07/16/2021
have been proven to hold, all required security controls
of the LDACS cell-attachment procedure also hold in the
symbolic model.
7. Conclusion
Throughout this work, the full LDACS cell-attachment
procedure, together with AS, GS certificates, possible
cipher suites, and options for certificate revocations and
validity checks were presented. Looking at two other
aeronautical communications systems for terrestrial com-
munications, namely AMS and AeroMACS, pros- and
cons of their security design were discussed. This resulted
in identifying ephemeral key establishment, multiple ci-
pher suites and regular validity checks for certificates
as design goals for the LDACS cell-attachment proce-
dure. As LDACS will have its own dedicated PKI, the
content of end-entity AS and GS certificates, together
with pre- (ECDSA) and post-quantum (Falcon) signature
options was discussed. Then cipher suite options for user-
data AEAD and MAKE algorithms were summarized
in EPLDACS and control-data protection algorithms in
CCLDACS, with the main focus of this work on the first.
Finally the entire LDACS cell-attachment procedure was
introduced, spanning the original LDACS cell entry pro-
cedure, extending it with a 4-pass SIGMA/IKEv2 inspired
MAKE protocol. Finally, the design of that procedure
was formally verified with Tamarin, where it passed all
tests for Executability, Mutual Authentication, Secure Key
Establishment and Perfect Forward Secrecy.
For future work, the investigation of exact key deriva-
tion methods for KAS,GS , KE and KM , as well as the
detailed LDACS control channel protection is paramount,
to arrive at a full LDACS cybersecurity architecture.
Appendix
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and
Reporting System
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated
Data
AeroMACS Aeronautical Mobile Airport
Communication System
AMS ACARS Message Security
AOC Aeronautical Operational Control
AS Aircraft Station
ATN/IPS Air Traffic Network/IP-Protocol Suite
ATN Air Traffic Network
ATM Air Traffic Management




CDS Certificate Distribution Center
CMAC cipher-based MAC
CMS Coding and Modulation Scheme




DHKE Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ENR En-Route
FL Forward Link
GKM Group Key Management
GS Ground Station
HKDF HMAC Key Derivation Function
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IPS IP-Protocol Suite
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEK Key Encryption Key
LDACS L-band Digital Aeronautical
Communication System
MAC Message Authentication Code
MAKE Mutual Authentication and Key
Establishment
NIST National Institute of Standards and
Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
PHY-SDU Physical Layer Service Data Unit




SIKE Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation
STS Station to Station
TEK Traffic Encryption Key
VDLm2 VHF Digital Link Mode 2
VHF Very High Frequency
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